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Abstract: Fichte’s admiration for Kant’s 
Third Critique is well-documented, but 
how did it actually infl uence his own phi-
losophy? This question is addressed, fi rst, by 
examining Fichte’s very early, unpublished 
“summary” of Kant’s text, and, second, by 
considering how themes from the latter are 
present in Fichte’s later published and un-
published writings. These include: the unity 
of theoretical and practical philosophy and 
of the sensible and supersensible realms; the 
purposiveness of nature; the autonomy and 
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and harmony of the drives as a key ingredient 
in moral deliberation.
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No human understanding can advance further that that 
boundary recognized by Kant, especially in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment—a boundary, however, which he never 
determined for us specifi cally and which he declared to be the 
fi nal boundary of fi nite knowledge 
Preface to Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre
T his passage, which may serve as an epigraph for what follows, has long intrigued me and provoked several questions. What is the “boundary” to which Fichte is here referring? Where 
does it lie? Why did he credit Kant with its discovery, and why does 
Fichte associate this discovery specifi cally with the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment? Why did he subsequently describe this same 
work as “the summit of Kantian speculation,” and how and to what 
extent was his own philosophical project infl uenced by his personal 
engagement with the third Critique? In addressing these question, I 
will begin with a survey and summary of Fichte’s explicit comments, 
both public and private, concerning the third Critique and conclude 
by enumerating some specifi c parallels between certain features of 
the third Critique and Fichte’s new and improved version of the 
Critical philosophy.
I
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft was published in the spring 1790. On 
May 5 of that same year Fichte arrived in Leipzig and remained 
there for nearly a year. His letters from the fi rst half of the summer, 
including those to his fi ancé in Zurich, Johanna Rahn, are fi lled with 
lamentations about the failure of his various professional schemes 
and literary projects—plans that included: taking lessons in public 
oratory, establishing a literary magazine for women, composing a 
tragic drama, and writing a romantic novella. Consequently, he had 
to beg his fi ancé to send him money, while cautioning her not to 
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tell her father.1 At one point he reported that he was reduced to 
pawning all of his possessions except for the clothes on his back.2 
Near the end of the summer, however, he fi nally began to earn some 
money as a private tutor of mathematics and Greek.3 Sometime in 
August he began “to give private lessons on the Kantian philosophy” 
at the request of a student from the local university, who planned 
to leave Leipzig at the end of September4—this, of course, despite 
the fact that Fichte himself was not yet directly acquainted with any 
of Kant’s writings.5 Fichte met with this student from 3 and 4 p.m. 
every afternoon of the week and quickly discovered that his main 
1. Fichte to Johanne Rahn, May 14-15, 1790; GA, III/1: 113-15. [GA = J. G. Fichte-
Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Erich Fuchs, 
Reinhard Lauth†, and Hans Gliwitzky† (Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt, 1964ff.)]. 
2. Draft of a letter from Fichte to Dieter von Miltiz (the son of the nobleman 
who had fi rst “discovered” Fichte as a boy and who subsequently supported his 
education), beginning of August, 1790, GA, III/1: 164.
3. In addition to tutoring an unnamed university student in the Kantian philosophy, 
Fichte also gave lessons every afternoon in mathematics and Greek to the three 
young sons of the silk merchant, J. H. Thieriot. He must have been quite an 
effective Greek teacher—at least according to his December 6, 1790 letter to 
Johanna, in which he boasts that in just three months he has taught his ten-year-
old student enough Greek so “that now he can read Homer” (GA, III/1: 199). 
There is some evidence that Fichte may have begun tutoring even earlier in the 
summer, inasmuch as he wrote to his fi ancé on June 8 that “in a few days I will 
meet with my fi rst student” (GA, III/1: 129). We have no further information 
about this, however. 
4. As Frank Aschoff speculates, the reason Fichte was asked to give private lessons 
on Kant during the summer of 1790 may have been because Friedrich Gottlob 
Born, the main representative of Kantianism on the philosophy faculty at Leipzig 
(and best known for translating the Critique of Pure Reason into Latin), did not 
lecture on Kant during the summer semester of 1790 [Zwischen äußerem Zwang 
und innerer Freiheit. Fichtes Hauslehrer-Erfahrungen und die Grundlegung seiner 
Philosophie, “Fichte-Studien” 9] (1997 41).
5. Draft of a letter from Fichte to Dietrich von Miltiz, beginning of August, 1790; 
GA, III/1: 165. As Armin G. Wildfeur notes, there is circumstantial evidence that 
Fichte became indirectly acquainted with Kant’s philosophy during his earlier, 
student days in Leipzig. His teacher at Leipzig, C. F. Pezold, published two 
articles critical of Kant in 1787, the same year that Fichte was most intensively 
involved with him [Praktische Vernunft und System. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche 
Untersuchungen zu urprüngliche Kant-Rezeption Johann Gottlieb Fichtes (Frommann-
Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1999) 367n.]. It is also quite possible that 
Fichte had discussed Kant’s philosophy with his good friend Friedrich August 
Weißhuhn prior to the summer of 1790.
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challenge was to make Kant’s diffi cult texts clear, both to his student 
and to himself.6 
We are all familiar with the “revolution” this serendipitous ex-
posure to the Critical philosophy produced in Fichte’s way of think-
ing, leading him to renounce his former opinion that no philosophy 
could ever successfully reconcile freedom and morality with natural 
necessity and that the only theoretically tenable position was Spi-
nozistic rational determinism. As he crowed to his fi ancé in his letter 
of August 12, 1790, “I have [now] thrown myself head over heels 
into the Kantian philosophy and have a distinct feeling that both my 
head and my heart have profi ted from this.”7 
He elaborates on this point in a letter from the same period to 
his friend F.A. Weißhuhn, to whom he writes:
I have been living in a new world ever since reading the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason. Propositions have been overturned for 
me that I thought could never be overturned, and things have 
been proven that I thought could never be proven—for exam-
ple, the concepts of absolute freedom and of duty—and I feel 
all the happier for this.8 
Fichte then explains the circumstances under which he has become 
familiar with all three of Kant’s Critiques and mentions that he had 
been contemplating publishing an introductory guide for readers 
of the fi rst Critique and indeed had begun work on such a project, 
only to abandon it upon learning that another author had published 
a similar guide.9
6. Fichte to Johanna Rahn, September 5, 1790, GA, III/1: 173.
7. Fichte to Johanna Rahn, August 12, 1790, GA, III/1: 166.
8. Fichte to F. A. Weißhuhn, August/September, 1790, GA, III/1: 168.
9. The “other” author in question was Johann Gottlieb Peuker, whose Darstellung 
des Kantischen Systems nach seinen Hauptmomenten zufolge der Vernunftkritik, und 
Beantwortung der dagegen gemachten Einwürfe. Besonders zum Gebrauch academischer 
Vorlesungen was published in 1790.
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It is worth noting, particularly in the light of the emphasis that 
is often placed upon the strongly “practical” or ethical dimension 
of Fichte’s appropriation of the Critical philosophy, that he did not 
move directly from his abandoned effort to explicate the fi rst Cri-
tique to a similar engagement with the second, but instead immedi-
ately began work on an “Attempt at a Clarifying Summary of Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgment.”10 This suggests that Fichte was 
at this point becoming more and more keenly interested in the sys-
tematic unity of the Critical philosophy, and that this was therefore 
not a concern that he fi rst acquired from his subsequent encounter 
with K. L. Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie. In any event, he unques-
tionably assigned special signifi cance to the third Critique, which 
he describes in his August/September 1790 letter to Weißhuhn as 
“convincing [evident], like everything of Kant’s, though clearer and 
better written than his previous works.”11 And yet, for all its supe-
rior “clarity,” Fichte was also acutely aware of certain obscurities 
and unresolved tensions within Kant’s text and of the pressing need 
for further “clarifi cation” of the same, despite that fact that, as he 
explained in his next letter to Weißhuhn, “nothing in the world is 
more diffi cult than clearly presenting Kantian ideas.” Accordingly, 
he announces in this same letter his intention to compose and to 
publish a “clearer exposition” of Kant’s text.12
Throughout the early fall of 1790 Fichte devoted as much time 
as was available to his “Clarifying Summary of the Critique of the 
10. “Versuch eines erklärenden Auszugs aus Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft” (GA, II/1: 
325-73). According to the editors of GA, this manuscript (or at least most of it) was 
composed between early-August and mid-September of 1790. A marginal note in 
Fichte’s hand on the fi rst page, however, states that it was composed between 
September 1790 and the beginning of 1791 and “intended for publication.”
11. GA, III/1: 168.
12. “What do you think about a clearer exposition of Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgment? After careful study (previously I only leafed through it, to employ 
Kant’s expression), it seems to me very much in need of this. Moreover, it contains 
many things that I either do not understand or which contradict themselves. I 
intend to write such a book and have already begun to do so, and I am fi nding 
this to be a diffi cult task. Will it also bring me honor? Nothing in the world is 
more diffi cult that clearly presenting Kantian ideas. I experience this every day 
in connection with preparations for my lessons on the Critique of Pure Reason” 
(Fichte to Weißhuhn, GA, III/1: 174-75).
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Power of Judgment,” spurred on, no doubt, by fear that someone else 
might once again beat him to this goal and reconciled to the fact 
that “if I want to publish it before being confronted with a hun-
dred competitors, I will simply have to publish it in a half-fi nished 
state.”13 The fi rst part of the manuscript was completed sometime 
in November, at which time Fichte sent it to Weißhuhn, accompa-
nied by a letter explaining the purpose of the project and requesting 
critical comments on the same. What he was trying to accomplish, 
he explained, was to eliminate the many repetitions in Kant’s text 
and to apply what he describes as Kant’s own “synthetic method” 
not just to the overall argument, but to the individual sub-sections 
as well precisely in order to make the systematic unity of the whole 
more perspicuous. In those places where Kant’s text seems clear, 
Fichte says he will retain Kant’s expressions, despite worries that 
this might make him appear to be guilty of plagiarism. The most 
obscure portion of Kant’s book is, he says, the Introduction, to the 
exposition of which he claims to have devoted special effort. He also 
reveals that he hopes to fi nish Part One, on aesthetic judgments, 
in time for publication at the New Year’s book fair and Part II, on 
teleological judgments, in time for the Easter fair.14
13. Fichte to H. N. Achelis, November 1790 (GA, III/1: 195). In this same letter, 
Fichte repeats the claim that his immersion in the Kantian philosophy has been 
the remedy for all the persistent ills and defects in his life and character and 
has produced a complete revolution in his way of thinking, especially regarding 
questions of morality and duty. He also informs Achelis that, after completing his 
work on the Third Critique, he intends to turn to a popular presentation of Kant’s 
moral principles (GA, III/1: 193-95).
14. “For some time now I have been particularly occupied with the study of Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, and, since it struck me as rather obscure, I 
thought that it might well strike others in the same way and that an effort to make 
it somewhat clearer would not be superfl uous. Up to this point, my thoughts 
were perhaps correct, but was I equally correct in thinking that I could be the 
person to make them clearer? This is what I wish to learn from you, which is 
why I am sending you the beginning of the manuscript, that is to say, the portion 
containing everything about which I am generally clear.—My intention was to 
omit repetitions and to bring the synthetic method, which Kant, in respect of 
the whole, implemented in an unrivaled manner, into the individual parts of the 
same, which often seem to me to be poorly organized. In the case of what is 
very obscure, I tried to use other—if not better, then at least clearer— words to 
express it, so that a reader who also has access to Kant’s book can view the matter 
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Weißhuhn, however, did not immediately respond to his 
friend’s request; instead, he kept the manuscript for more than six 
weeks, which obviously complicated Fichte’s plans for the timely 
completion of the same.15 Thus he now informs his fi ancé of his 
hope that his work will appear by Easter of 1791, even though he 
remains unsatisfi ed with it and thinks it is still too obscure. Indeed, 
he declares that he would not publish it at all were it not for various 
extraneous circumstances.16 
During the ensuing months, however, Fichte’s reservations 
concerning his “Clarifying Summary” appear to have waxed and his 
enthusiasm for publishing it to have waned. In any event, he does 
not appear to have done any further work on this project after April 
of 1791, when he left Leipzig and journeyed to Warsaw, where he 
from two sides. In the case of passages that seem to me to be clear enough, I have 
retained the Kantian expressions as much as possible. Is this plagiarism? I don’t 
think so, so long as the Preface explicitly takes note of this, which it will.” “The 
Introduction seems to me the most obscure part of the book. Of course, I made 
an effort to illuminate it, but I don’t know how well I succeeded. Here and there I 
departed from Kant’s way of presenting things [Vorstellungsart], since another way 
of arriving at the same result seemed clearer to me.” “After the fact, it seems to 
me that I would have done better to depart from Kant in organizing the individual 
materials. The presentation would have gained in clarity thereby, even if only 
through the altered point of view. At least it would have looked from the outside 
more like a scientifi cally unifi ed whole. If I have the time, I will perhaps send you 
as an appendix a short presentation of the Critique following a different line of 
thought.” “I must blush over the style, which is so uneven, so full of tautologies 
and repetitions of the same words and contains so many long sentences! But it is 
harder than one would think to present Kantian ideas in a fl uid style of writing, 
and I did not have time to do more. Even as it stands, I have revised several 
paragraphs more than fi ve times” (Fichte to Weißhuhn, November 1790, GA, 
III/1: 188-89).
15. As previously noted, the date “September 1790-Beginning of 1791” appears, 
in Fichte’s hand, on the fi rst page of the manuscript, along with the notation, 
“intended for publication.” This suggests that he may well have continued to 
work on the manuscript after sending a copy of the fi rst portion of the same to 
Weißhuhn in November of 1790. See GA, III/1: 321.
16. See Fichte’s December 27, 1790 letter to Johanna Rahn, in which he comments 
that “I am, by the way, very dissatisfi ed with my small book, and if I did not have 
many reasons to do so, I would not publish it. The German public is not so 
indulgent as the Zurichers. I am also afraid that it remains much more obscure 
than I intended. [....] Were it not almost necessary to do so, I would not publish it 
at all” (GA, III/1:205). 
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had obtained a new position as a private tutor.17 And yet it was still 
on his mind as he prepared for his interview with Kant in Königs-
berg in August of that year, listing in a memo to himself his pro-
jected “summary of his Critique of the Power of Judgment” as among 
the topics he intended to discuss with Kant.18
At this point, let us pause to consider in some detail the con-
tents of Fichte’s “Clarifying Summary of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment,” a text that is by no means well-known, even to Fichte 
scholars. Fichte’s summary closely follows the text of Kant’s third 
Critique, paragraph by paragraph, beginning with the vitally impor-
tant Introduction and continuing through §16 of the “Analytic of 
the Beautiful.” This amounts to less than one-fi fth of the entire 
book. Fichte retains Kant’s titles for each paragraph, though in a few 
cases these are slightly modifi ed in the interest of clarity. Generally 
speaking, the differences between Fichte’s summary and Kant’s text 
are very minor, and this manuscript is of interest mainly for what it 
chooses to emphasize or to de-emphasize. 
17. In his previously cited December 27, 1790 letter to Johanna Rahn, Fichte expressed 
reservations about the “obscurity” of his work and confi ded his reservations about 
publishing it. But in his March 1, 1791 letter to her he reports that “my poor little 
work has, until now, remained on the back burner and is now in the claws of the 
rapacious publishers.” He also reports that he withdrew it from consideration 
by another publisher because of the insulting low honorarium he was offered 
(GA, III/1: 218). By March 5, 1791, however (that is, only four days after his 
March 1 letter to Johanna Rahn) Fichte had already abandoned any immediate 
plans to complete and to publish his “Clarifying Summary.” As he explained to 
his brother, Samuel Gotthelf, “I began a work concerning this philosophy, a work 
that will probably never be published, since I never completed it; yet to this work 
I still owe my happiest days, as well as a very profi table revolution in my head 
and in my heart” (GA, III/1: 222). Though unmentioned by Fichte, one possible 
reason he eventually abandoned work on this project may well have been the 
publication, in 1791, of two introductory works devoted to the third Critique: F. 
W. D. SNELL’S Darstellung und Erläuterung der Kantischen Critik der ästhetischen 
Urtheilskraft (Schwann and Gösz, Mannheim, 1791) and KARL SPAZIER’S Versuch 
einer kurzen und faßlichen Darstellung der teleologischen Principien - ein Auszug aus 
Kants Kritik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft (Johann Ludwig Gehra, Neuwied, 
1791).
18. Zur Vorbereitung auf die Visite, July 4, 1795, GA, II/2: 11.
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Let us begin with the Introduction: 
I. On the Division of Philosophy. Philosophy is “the science of 
the principles of rational cognition of things through concepts,” or-
ganized according to the fundamental distinction between our “ob-
jective” concepts of nature and our equally “objective” concepts of 
freedom, each of which has as its “principle” a different type of cau-
sality and each of which establishes the domain for a distinct branch 
of philosophy. This section is simply an abbreviated paraphrase of 
Kant’s, with the addition of a new example of a “technical-practical 
precept,” viz., rules for mastering one’s anger. Fichte was, of course, 
all too clearly aware of the great difference between the “causality 
of freedom” and the “causality of nature” long before becoming 
acquainted with Kant, and was deeply and personally preoccupied 
with the problem of “reconciling” these two kinds of causality—
something which, prior to his study of Kant, he had concluded to be 
impossible. Indeed, this prior interest helps explain Fichte’s special 
preoccupation with the Critique of the Power of Judgment, since this 
is the text in which Kant himself most explicitly addresses this issue. 
II. On the Domain of Philosophy in General. Here again, in what is 
for Fichte perhaps the most signifi cant section of the Introduction, 
he summarizes Kant’s presentation while departing considerably 
from the letter of the same. In formulating the problem of relating 
the natural and the moral realms, for example, he endorses, even 
more urgently than Kant himself, the need to postulate some sort 
of underlying principle of unity, one that is neither “theoretical” nor 
“practical.” While faithful to the original, Fichte’s summary of this 
section nevertheless frames this issue in a light that—in retrospect, 
of course—seems presciently and distinctively “Fichtean” and il-
luminates Fichte’s subsequent claim that it was only in the third 
Critique that Kant fi nally arrived at the “ultimate boundary of all 
human understanding.”19 Consider, for example, the following pas-
sage from Fichte’s summary:
19. This is from the Preface to Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, written 
in the spring of 1794 (GA, I/2: 110).
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Our entire power of cognition has two domains, that of the 
concept of nature and that of the concept of freedom, for it legis-
lates a priori through both. [....] Even though these two leg-
islations are infi nitely different, both in their aim and in their 
domain, they nevertheless have one and the same territory 
[Boden], namely, the realm of experience in its entirety; they 
must, therefore, ceaselessly interact with one another [in ein-
ander greifen], if not in their respective legislation, then in the 
effects of the same, which occur in one and the same sensible 
world. [....] Even though an unbridgeable gulf is fi xed between 
the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible domain, and 
the supersensible domain of the concept of freedom, the cau-
sality of freedom nevertheless ought to realize within the sen-
sible world a goal assigned by its own laws, and do so not by 
prescribing these laws of freedom to the sensible world, yet 
nevertheless in harmony with the laws proper to the latter. 
This, however, would be impossible if the same nature that is 
determined by the laws of the concept of nature, which takes 
no account whatsoever of the goals of freedom, could not, as 
it were, somehow agree with the goals according to the laws 
of freedom; it would be impossible if both legislations, each 
of which follows its own path, independently of and without 
taking any notice of the other, did not have somewhere a com-
mon point of union. [….] The point of unity can therefore lie 
nowhere but in that supersensible [realm] that is thought of as 
underlying nature.20
Comparing this with Kant’s original, one notes that whereas Kant 
denies in no uncertain terms the possibility of any cognition of the 
postulated supersensible ground of nature and freedom, Fichte de-
nies only the possibility of any “direct cognition” of the same. He is 
also much more explicit than Kant in emphasizing that the empirical 
effi cacy of the moral law would be impossible in the absence of such 
a supersensible ground, which unlike Kant, Fichte describes as an 
20. GA, II/1: 328-30.
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“explanatory” principle. He also goes beyond Kant in asserting not 
merely that there must be a “common root” of pure understanding 
and practical reason but also in maintaining that these two types of 
a priori legislation “reciprocally determine” one another.21
III. On the Critique of the Power of Judgment as the Means of Join-
ing the Two Parts of Philosophy into a Whole. Here Fichte follows Kant 
in identifying the power of judgment as an “intermediary” power of 
the mind, entrusted with the task of mediating between the claims 
and laws of the understanding, which legislate a priori for our cogni-
tion of nature, and those of reason, which can determine our power 
of desire a priori, in accordance with the practical laws of freedom. 
The power of judgment is also “intermediate” in a second sense, 
since it legislates a priori for the soul’s “intermediate” capacity for 
feeling pleasure and displeasure. Though any claims resulting from 
the application of the power of judgment would have to be consid-
ered “theoretical,” in the broader sense of the term (which includes 
both natural science and philosophy), they would nevertheless be-
long to a separate, “higher” branch of philosophy: the critique of 
the power of judgment, which is concerned solely with the system of 
reason itself and the general powers of the mind in their systematic 
relationship to one another. 
IV. On the Power of Judgment as a Power that Legislates a priori. 
Though this section contains nothing new, it is nevertheless longer 
than Kant’s original, which suggests that Fichte was keenly aware 
of the crucial importance of this section for the project described in 
the preceding ones, and particularly appreciative of the signifi cance 
of Kant’s distinction between “determinative” and “refl ective” (or 
“refl ecting,” refl ectieriende) judgment.
A “judgment” is here described simply as a way of thinking 
some particular (whether a concept, an intuition, or a manifold of 
intuitions) under a higher, more universal concept. One way to do 
this is to begin with a universal concept and then “apply” the same 
to some particular or set of particulars, which is thereby “subsumed 
under” the wider concept. It is the task of the understanding to 
21. On this point see A. WILDFEUER, op. cit., 426.
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make “determinative” judgments of this sort, whether pure (a priori) 
or empirical (a posteriori). But one can also proceed in just the op-
posite manner; instead of descending from the universal to the par-
ticular, one can begin with the particular and then “seek out” some 
universal under which it can, in turn, be “subsumed.” Fichte follows 
Kant in assigning this essential task not to the understanding, but to 
the power of refl ective judgment [refl ectierende Urteilskraft], since it 
is only by “refl ecting” upon the particulars in question that we are 
able to envision some higher concept (or principle of unity) to which 
they may—or may not—conform. This power of refl ection enables 
reason to legislate for itself not only within the practical domain, but 
also within the theoretical. 
The method of refl ective judgment is not logical deduction, 
but rather experimental thinking. This is a process of trial and error, 
which involves making and testing hypotheses. Only in this way 
can the power of judgment “seek out” (aufsuchen) that higher unity 
that it begins by postulating or assuming. The principle that guides 
the power of judgment in its efforts to discover ever higher forms 
of unity in the theoretical domain is the rational idea (Idee) of a 
higher understanding that provides us with a natural realm that can 
by unifi ed by scientifi c understanding. Hence the legislation of the 
power of judgment with respect to our cognitive power is always 
only regulative and hypothetical, directing us to consider nature as 
a whole and all of the specifi c, empirical laws of the same, as if these 
were produced by a higher intellect in order to make it possible for 
us to advance in our efforts to grasp nature as a rational whole. But 
in doing this we treat nature itself as produced according to the con-
cept of a goal (Zweck) and thus as “purposive” for our understand-
ing. The general principle guiding the employment of the power 
of judgment is therefore that of “purposiveness” (Zweckmäßigkeit). 
This is more or less a direct paraphrase of Kant’s text, but 
Fichte is even more forceful than Kant in reminding his intended 
readers that such refl ective judgments by no means assert the actual 
existence of any “higher understanding”; on the contrary, he writes, 
“by means of this principle the power of judgment only gives to it-
self a subjective law of hypothetical validity: [a law that prescribes] how 
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it must proceed if it wishes to order this manifold in a single system-
atic experience, and how this manifold must be viewed if cognition 
of the same is to be possible for us.”22 
V. The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature is a Tran-
scendental Principle of the Power of Judgment. Fichte’s main innovation 
in this section, which is only half as long as Kant’s original text, is 
to introduce at the appropriate point the subtitle, “transcendental 
deduction of the concept of the formal purposiveness of nature,” 
But, as Rolf-Peter Horstmann has pointed out, what Fichte actually 
offers here is not only not a “transcendental deduction” in any Kan-
tian sense, it is not even a good argument, inasmuch as it consists 
simply of affi rming the consequent of the hypothetical argument: 
if our understanding demands that we unify all of our experiences 
systematically, then we must assume that we can grasp these higher 
laws of nature.23 
We can pass quickly over sections VI, VII, and VIII as contain-
ing very little beyond a paraphrase of Kant’s text, though in section 
VII Fichte does introduce a useful distinction between (1) the sensi-
ble content or “matter” of a representation of an object of intuition, 
(2) the spatiotemporal “form” of the same, and (3) the “the essence 
[Wesen] of the same, which is cognized by referring it to a deter-
minate concept of the understanding,” whereas Kant distinguishes 
only between “matter” and “form.” 
IX. On the Connection of the Legislation of Understanding and of 
Reason by Means of the Power of Judgement. This, the concluding sec-
tion of Kant’s Introduction contains some of his most explicit and 
provocative, albeit still hedged and tentative, speculations concern-
ing the systematic unity of the mind and the interrelations between 
its various powers or “faculties” (understanding, judgment, and 
reason). Important as these remarks undoubtedly were as inspira-
tion for Fichte’s own future project, his summary is disappointingly 
brief (less than half the length if Kant’s original) and, again, consists 
22. GA, II/1: 333.
23. R.P. HORSTMANN, Die Grenzen der Vernunft: Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und 
Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus (Beltz Atheneum, Weinheum, 2005, 2nd ed.) 202.
DANIEL BREAZEALE
126 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 113-144
mainly of nearly direct quotations from Kant, including his table 
of the various faculties of the mind, along with their principles and 
domains of applications. 
The specifi c problem emphasized in Fichte’s summary is the 
one thematized in the “Aphorisms on Religion and Deism” he 
composed in August of 1790, just as he was beginning his study 
of Kant: namely, how to conceive of the powers of understanding 
and (practical, moral) reason as co-existing with one another, or, 
in Fichte’s preferred idiom (borrowed from Jacobi), how to recon-
cile the demands of the “head” (here associated with philosophical 
deism based on reason) with those of the “heart” (associated with 
“religion” based on sentiment).24 For Fichte, the problem is to dis-
cover a way of thinking of nature as at least compatible with freedom, 
yet without violating the experienced, causal order of the former. 
Hence, he enthusiastically endorses what he takes to be Kant’s solu-
tion: namely, to employ one’s power of judgment in order to refl ect 
upon nature as a whole as “purposive” and possessing an external 
“ground” in the free will of a higher form of intelligence and thus in 
harmony with our morally postulated “causality through freedom.” 
“The law of freedom,” writes Fichte, “thus ought to produce 
its effect within nature in complete agreement with the laws of na-
ture. But this cannot not even be thought of as possible, except by 
means of the principle of the power of refl ective judgment,”25 that is, 
the principle of the purposiveness of nature. This, of course, is pre-
cisely the same insight that underlies Fichte’s entire account of the 
relationship between the pure I and the fi nite Not-I in the Jena Wis-
senschaftslehre, which might therefore be interpreted as a sustained 
effort to fl esh out and make good on the proposals and suggestions 
put forward by Kant in section IX of his Introduction to the third 
Critique. The task of the Wissenschaftslehre, after all, is precisely to 
demonstrate that the “pure I” is the “supersensible substrate” of both 
the empirical, fi nite I and of nature, the domain of the “Not-I”—
and, in a step beyond anything ever imagined by Kant himself, to 
24. Einige Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus, GA, II/1: 287-91.
25. GA, II/1: 345-46.
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do so by deriving both the limited I and limited Not-I as conditions 
for the possibility of that original, free and ungrounded act of self-
positing with which the system begins. 
X. Brief Overview of this Introduction. This concluding section, 
which summarizes the preceding nine sections, was added by Fichte. 
Though it provides nothing new, it does provide a useful overview 
of the entire introduction.
The rest of Fichte’s manuscript is devoted to a partial summary 
of Book One of Part One of the Third Critique. Accordingly, he du-
tifully summarizes the fi rst 16 numbered paragraphs of Book One, 
which include the First, Second, and Third “Moments of Aesthetic 
Judgment” (according to quality, quantity, and relation), breaking 
off one § short of the end of the Third Moment. This portion of his 
“Clarifying Summary” follows Kant’s text even more closely than 
does his summary of the Introduction and relies even more heavily 
upon direct quotations and paraphrases. Yet there are a still some 
differences between Fichte’s version and Kant’s original, and a few 
of these are worth mentioning. One example occurs in his summary 
of § 9, in which Fichte emphasizes the crucial role of the “free play 
of the power of imagination” in a judgment of taste (whereas Kant, 
of course, speaks of the free play of the faculties or mental pow-
ers, including, but not limited to the power of imagination). It is 
also worth noting that Fichte here employs the term “Schweben”26 
to describe the activity of the power of imagination as it “oscil-
lates” between or “fl oats” or “hovers” above various concepts of the 
understanding—a term employed by Kant later in the third Critique, 
though not in this section).27
26. In fact, Kant does use the term “Schweben” in § 17 (not included in Fichte’s 
summary) to describe the way in which the “Normalidee” or “standard idea” or 
“image” (Bild) or “archetype” (Urbild) of an entire species or kind “oscillates 
between” all the individual intuitions of individuals. According to this same 
account, it is the power of imagination that produces these images. Kant, however, 
does not describe the power of imagination as itself “oscillating” or “fl oating”; it 
is only the product of the same, the image, that he describes in this way.
27. “This state of mind [that accompanies any reference of a representation to 
any object whatsoever, taken by itself, in abstraction from its object] is the 
combination of the manifold in a given intuition by means of the power of 
imagination, in accordance with one or another concept of the understanding; therefore, 
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The fi nal section of Fichte’s incomplete summary of the Cri-
tique of the Power of Judgment (§ 16) commences with a note explain-
ing that the author has found in necessary, in this and the following 
sections to depart substantially from Kant’s own method of presen-
tation, “for reasons that will become evident from my presentation 
itself.” But in fact, § 16 follows Kant’s text quite closely and the 
“following sections” to which he refers appear never to have been 
written. 
One reason the manuscript breaks off at this point may well have 
been that Fichte was unsure about the extent and character of his con-
templated “departures” from the original text. In its unfi nished state, 
however, his summary of Book One of the Analytic of the Beautiful 
contains very little that is new or original and provides precious little 
“elucidation” of Kant’s text, even if it does manage, here and there, 
to “clarify” his arguments and conclusions a bit. For the most part, 
however, Fichte’s “clarifying summary” consists of little more than 
close paraphrases, interspersed with direct, but unacknowledged quo-
tations. His worry that he might be accused of plagiarism when his 
summary was published appears to have been well-justifi ed.28 
it is an agreement of the two powers [of imagination and understanding].” “If the 
representation of this state [of mind] is to remain merely subjective and not to 
become objective by being referred to some determinate concept, then the power 
of imagination cannot be limited to any particular concept, according to which 
it connects the manifold, but it will oscillate [Schweben] in a free play between 
all the concepts of the understanding. It will not combine [the manifold] in 
accordance with this or that concept, but simply in a manner conformable to concepts 
in general.—(The power of imagination grasps the mere form, as an already 
determinate limitation of an object, whether limited for outer or for inner sense, 
just as it is given and without borrowing the rule for the connection of the same 
from any concept of the understanding. Since the connection has not occurred 
in accordance with concepts, the power of judgment cannot have the function 
of subsuming the representation that arises in this way under a concept of the 
understanding; it nevertheless involuntarily compares the form that is taken up by 
the power of imagination with [its] referability to concepts in general and discovers 
that the former is conformable to the latter. It thereby discovers that something 
is combined in the power of imagination—combined in a manner not determined 
by the understanding, but, as it were, by accident—just as it would have to be 
combined were this determined by the understanding. It thereby discovers that 
the power of imagination and the understanding are in accidental agreement with 
one another.)” (GA, II/1: 361).
28. Fichte to Weißhuhn, August-September, 1790, GA, III/1: 188-90.
FICHTE’S RECEPTION OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE
129ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 113-144
As noted, Fichte’s “Clarifying Summary” contains numerous 
problematic passages and mistakes concerning Kantian terminology 
and fully deserves Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s characterization as “the 
work of a beginner,” both in the sense that is the work of someone 
just becoming acquainted for the fi rst time with the Critical phi-
losophy and in the sense that it is the work of beginner in philoso-
phy itself.29 This, however, does not mean that one should endorse 
Horstmann’s rejection of the “Clarifying Summary” as contributing 
nothing to one’s understanding of the genesis of the Wissenschaft-
slehre or concur with his claim that the third Critique is really not as 
important as authors such as Hegel have maintained for the genesis 
of post-Kantian philosophy in general and of Fichte’s Wissenschaft-
slehre in particular.30 
On the contrary, a close reading of Fichte’s manuscript sug-
gests that Kant‘s Introduction provided him with a new and much 
deeper appreciation of the speculative and systematic issues underly-
ing his own, long-standing preoccupation with the task of recon-
ciling freedom and necessity. Whereas he had previously treated 
this is a problem that could be addressed only “practically” and not 
philosophically, he was now convinced not only that this task is not 
philosophically impossible, but that the key to solving it lies in the 
identifi cation of the common ground or root of the domains of both 
nature and freedom and that the proper instrument for exploring 
this new territory is the power of refl ecting judgment.31 
29. R.-P. HORSTMANN, Die Grenzen der Vernunft: Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und 
Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus (Beltz Atheneum, Weinheum, 2nd ed., 2005) 201.
30. See R.-P. HORSTMANN cit., 195-298. Concerning Hegel’s infl uential interpretation 
of the third Critique as the true font of post-Kantian speculative philosophy, see 
his discussion of “Fichtean Philosophy” in Part C of Glauben und Wissen. 
31. Armin Wildfeuer makes a similar point when he notes that Fichte’s engagement 
with the third Critique both gave him a new, comprehensive view of the Critical 
philosophy as a systematic whole and suggested a new possibility for the presenta-
tion of the same (op. cit., 422).
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His engagement with Kant’s Introduction also seems to have 
persuaded him that, just as the fi rst Critique had to be understood 
in the light of the second, so both the fi rst and the second had to be 
reinterpreted in the light of the third—or rather, in the light of that 
systematic whole the outline of which could be at least dimly discerned 
therein. This led to an appreciation of the intimate connection be-
tween two issues that might at fi rst have appeared to be altogether 
unrelated to one another: viz., the problem concerning the unity of 
the divided human self, split between the dictates of the head and 
the demands of the heart, and the systematic unity of philosophy 
itself. Whereas Fichte’s earlier speculative efforts had generally led 
him to stress the opposition between theory and practice, nature and 
freedom, etc., following his initial encounter with the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment his new project was to grasp and to articulate the 
underlying unity of the human subject and of the complete system of 
transcendental philosophy. As Wildfeuer observes, Fichte’s interest 
in the Critique of the Power of Judgment was systematic in nature from 
the start, and he clearly intended to emphasize this aspect of the text 
in his “Clarifying Summary.”32 
Fichte’s systematic concern with the “original unity”—of rea-
son, of experience, of philosophy, and indeed, of the human self—
launched him upon a new quest to discover the “supersensible 
ground” that unites what appear, within experience, to be absolute 
opposites. At this early date, of course, he had not yet discovered 
that the unifying principle in question is that of selfhood as such. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to maintain that he would have been un-
likely to make such a “discovery” had he not been impelled toward it 
by his careful study of the third Critique in the late summer and fall 
of 1790 and by his ultimately unsuccessful effort to compose and to 
publish a “clarifying summary” of the same, an enterprise which he 
nevertheless described as “responsible for a very profi table revolu-
tion in my head and heart.”33
32. See A. WILDFEUER, op. cit., 222.
33. Fichte to Samuel Gotthelf Fichte, March 5, 1791, GA, III/1: 222.
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Before enumerating some of the many ways in which Fichte 
appears to have been infl uenced by his study of the third Critique, let 
me complete this survey of what Fichte had to say about this work 
in the years following his initial engagement with it. Long after he 
had abandoned his plan to publish a reader’s guide to this text he 
continued to refer to it in the most positive terms and to insist upon 
its importance not simply for understanding aesthetic and teleologi-
cal judgments, but for understanding the possibility and limits of 
systematic philosophy as a whole.
The infl uence of Fichte’s engagement with the third Critique is 
easy to detect in his writings during the winter of 1793-94, when he 
was living with his new wife in Zurich. It was during this time that 
he worked intensively on a long and complex manuscript entitled 
Eigne Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie/Practische Philosophie,34 
in which he re-examines the foundations and systematic structure 
of the entire Critical system under the direct infl uence of K. L. 
Reinhold’s effort to do the same in his own ElementarPhilosophie. 
Though the third Critique is mentioned by name only twice in this 
manuscript, it is in fact replete with indirect references to Kant’s 
text and makes frequent use of terminology derived from the same. 
This is especially true of the portion entitled “Practical Philoso-
phy,” which Horstmann describes, somewhat hyperbolically, as “a 
systematic commentary on the Critique of the Power of Judgment.”35
During this same period he also composed his review of Le-
onhard Creuzer’s Skeptische Betrachtung über die Freiheit des Willens 
[…], which was published in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung in Oc-
tober 1793. Though the third Critique is not mentioned by name 
in this review, it is quite clearly alluded to in an important passage 
34. GA, II, 21-266.
35. R.-P. HORSTMANN, op. cit., 204. Even though he maintains that Kant here helps 
himself to the entire structure and apparatus of the third Critique, Horstmann still 
downplays the infl uence of the same upon the development of Fichte’s philosophy 
and points out that he never, in the manuscript on “Practical Philosophy,” 
explicitly identifi es the third Critique as the key for proceeding beyond Kant. 
For a close reading of the Practische Philosophie manuscript in the light of the 
third Critique see A. KUBIK, Auf dem Weg zu Fichtes früher Ästhetik. Die Rolle der 
Einbildungskraft in der Kritik der Urteilskraft, “Fichte-Studien” 33 (2009) 7-16.
DANIEL BREAZEALE
132 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 113-144
discussing the relationship and harmony between the domain of the 
thing in itself, here understood as the realm of freedom, and that of 
appearance, i.e., the natural, sensible world.36 
Fichte’s fi rst explicit public mention of Kant’s third Critique 
comes in the Vorrede to the fi rst edition of Ueber den Begriff der 
Wissenschaftslehre, which was published in May of 1794 and which 
includes the declaration with which I began.37 What is intriguing 
about this passage is not only its extraordinarily high praise for the 
third Critique but also its implicit suggestion that much more re-
mains to be said concerning that “boundary” which Kant recognized 
but failed to determine adequately.
At about the same time, in his June 17, 1794 letter to Kant, 
Fichte confi des that it was only in the third (and not in the second) 
Critique that he discovered “a harmony with my own convictions 
concerning the practical portion of philosophy.”38 Fichte refers 
36. How, asks Fichte, can we conceive of the relationship between a spontaneously 
free act of willing and the natural world in which it supposed to have its effect—a 
realm of determinate being, in which every appearance has its suffi cient ground in 
a preceding one? How can the latter be in harmony with the free determination 
of the will for the sake of the moral world order? The ground of the harmony 
in question, Fichte concludes, can lie neither in nature nor in freedom, “but only 
in a higher law, which subsumes both freedom and nature—in, as it were, a pre-
determined harmony of determinations through freedom with determinations 
through the law of nature.” (GA, I/2: 11). Though we possess no theoretical insight 
into this higher law, we can at least grasp we are unable to grasp it, and this, insists 
Fichte, is Kant’s view as well. Kant’s well-known assertion that freedom possesses 
causality within the sensible world must therefore be interpreted as no more than a 
preliminary statement of his true opinion, according to which “purposiveness is the 
principle of the refl ective power of judgment, which connects both legislations (the 
possibility of which can be comprehended only with reference to a third, higher type 
of legislation)” (GA, I/2: 12). The allusion to the third Critique, though implicit, is 
impossible to miss. Instead, on this point Fichte refers his reader to Kant’s published 
critique of Eberhard’s Leibnizian attack upon the Critical philosophy, Ueber eine 
Entdeckung nach der all neue Critik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich 
gemacht warden soll, as well as to the fi rst essay in Kant’s recently published Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.
37. “The author remains sincerely convinced that no human understanding can 
advance further than that boundary recognized [gesteht] by Kant, especially in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment —a boundary, however, which he never 
determined for us specifi cally and which he declared to be the fi nal boundary of 
fi nite knowledge” (GA, I/2: 110).
38. GA, III/2: 138.
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again to the third Critique in his letter to Reinhold the following 
summer, in which he boasts that in his new system he has succeeded 
not merely in establishing the systematic unity of the fi rst Critique 
but also in unifying in a single system all three Critiques.39
A month later, in his August 3, 1795 letter to Gottlieb Hufe-
land regarding books Fichte had already agreed to review in the 
Jena Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Fichte reports that he will be able 
to complete his assigned review of the third and fourth editions of 
the Critique of Pure Reason only if he is permitted to provide a com-
pletely new interpretation of the same. Only recently, he explains, 
as a result of his study of Hume, has he come to realize what is really 
at stake in the fi rst Critique and to recognize what Kant was actu-
ally trying to accomplish in this work—as well as why he failed to 
do this. This realization, he continues, explains why and how Kant 
was driven far beyond the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
fi rst in the second Critique and then especially in the third.40 Here 
once again Fichte plainly suggests that his own project involves a 
reinterpretation of Kant’s entire Critical philosophy in the light of 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
Two years later, in his July 4, 1797 letter to Reinhold, Fichte 
concedes that there might well seem to be a contradiction between 
the Wissenschaftslehre and some of Kant’s explicit statements. But 
this, he adds, really indicates only a contradiction within Kant’s own 
work. Granted, certain passages in the fi rst Critique suggest that he 
was committed to the absurd notion that sensations are produced 
within the human mind by the causal effi cacy of unknowable things 
in themselves, but, says Fichte, Kant himself has at least pointed 
toward the solution to the problem concerning the origin of ex-
ternal sensations, “especially in the Introduction to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment,” even though he has failed to develop this 
suggestion any further and seems content to reject such questions 
as unanswerable.41 
39. Fichte to Reinhold, July 2, 1795, GA, III/2: 346.
40. GA, III/2: 359.
41. GA, III/3: 70.
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Fichte’s next reference to the third Critique occurs seven years 
later, in his March 31, 1804 letter to Jacobi, in which he writes: “In 
my view there are no less than three Critical philosophies of Kant, 
each of which has a different absolute, the best [vorzüglichste] of 
which is that of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.”42 That same 
month, in his Aphorismen für Mme de Staël, prepared for the private 
use of the visiting French literary celebrity, Fichte distinguishes two 
different ways of proceeding in philosophy: One can begin with 
certain fundamental distinctions discovered within empirical con-
sciousness and then assert (but not prove) the systematic unity of 
these distinguished elements. As an illustration of this method, he 
refers to Kant’s Introduction to the third Critique, “in which he 
stands at the summit of his speculations” [in welcher er auf den Gipfel 
seiner Spekulation steht].43 Or, on the other hand, one can, in the 
manner of the newest presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, begin 
with something that is, in its absolute, inner quality, neither being 
nor consciousness.
A similar description of the third Critique recurs in Fichte’s 
May 8, 1806 letter to Jacobi, in which he compares his concep-
tion of ethics (Sittenlehre) with that of Jacobi, insisting that, “no 
Sittenlehre can be anything other than what is for Kant and for me. 
Sittenlehre, however, is something very limited and subordinate. I 
have never considered in any other way, nor has Kant, at least in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which is the summit of Kantian 
speculation.”44 
42. GA, III/5: 237. This passage continues as follows: “And yet, as I see it, one cannot 
grasp Kant from what he says, but only in what he does not say (or indeed, when 
others say it, opposes), but which must nevertheless be tacitly presupposed in 
order to arrive at what he fi rst said.”
43. GA, II/7: 247.
44. GA, III/5: 355-56.
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Finally, in the second lecture in his 1807 presentation of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, which includes a lengthy discussion of Kant, 
Fichte repeats his early claim that each of Kant’s Critiques has its 
own distinctive “absolute.” But now he elaborates a bit on this 
obscure claim, explaining that the absolute for the Critique of pure 
Reason is sensible experience and for the Critique of practical Reason 
the moral world. Neither of the fi rst two Critiques has any place 
for the absolute embraced by the other, nor can either of them ac-
count for certain important phenomena of self-observation, which 
are neither theoretical cognitions nor categorical moral concepts, 
such as the beautiful, the sublime, and the purposive. The relation 
of the sensible to the supersensible world is, claims Fichte, most 
explicitly discussed by Kant in the Introduction to the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, which he describes as “the most all-im-
portant part of this very important book.”45 Hence the absolute 
for the third Critique is the common root of both the sensible 
and supersensible domains, an absolute that Fichte describes as 
suffi cient unto itself and separate from the other two. Of course, 
Kant believed this absolute to be forever uncognizable by fi nite 
intellects, and this is why he failed to grasp adequately his own, 
fi nal absolute and why he was unable to show how both the sensible 
and supersensible worlds proceed from it—which is precisely what 
Fichte claims the Wissenschaftslehre can do.46
II
Following this rather exhaustive (but I hope not exhausting) survey 
of Fichte’s explicit references to and comments on Kant’s Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, I propose to conclude on a rather different, 
comparative note. In what follows I will simply be mentioning—ex 
cathedra, as it were—the various ways in which Fichte’s project ap-
pears to me to have been decisively infl uenced by his engagement 
with Kant’s third Critique. Each of those thirteen points should be 
45. GA, II/8: 31.
46. GA II/8: 27-35.
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viewed simply as a theme for further research, since I will be unable 
on this occasion to develop any of them in any detail.
1. The unity of philosophy. One of the more conspicuous features 
of the Wissenschaftslehre is the way it thoroughly integrates the “the-
oretical” and “practical” portions of the system of transcendental 
philosophy as a whole and derives the fi rst principles of both from 
a common root or single starting point—the unconditioned self-
positing of the pure I. Here there is no question of treating either 
portion in isolation from the other, since, for Fichte, willing is just 
as constitutive of cognition as cognition is of willing—a point made 
explicitly in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre but more 
perspicuously in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.
2. The unity of the supersensible and sensible realms, of freedom and 
nature. One of Fichte’s main objectives in constructing his new sys-
tem was to take up Kant’s suggestion that the teleological view of 
nature in relation to moral ends allows us, for the fi rst time, to make 
sense of our necessary belief in the sensible/practical effi cacy of free, 
supersensible determinations of the will. On the one hand, Fichte 
derives the sensible from the supersensible realm, that is, he derives 
both the fi nite I and the fi nite Not-I from the pure, absolute I with 
the concept of which he begins. On the hand, his transcendental 
derivation also demonstrates that the supersensible realm necessarily 
presupposes its own sensible expression. The only actual I is fi nite.
3. The common root of the sensible and supersensible realms. The 
common root postulated by Kant of both nature and freedom, as 
well as of theoretical and practical philosophy, can only be that 
spontaneously self-posited fact/act or Tathandlung which consti-
tutes the essence of subjectivity, a subject that is always an object 
for itself. To be sure, Kant had already declared in the second Cri-
tique that “the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved 
by an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of 
the entire structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative 
reason.”47 However, it was by no means obvious either what such 
a system would actually look like or how the proposed “keystone” 
47. Critique of Practical Reason, AA, V, 3-4.
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could function as such. These questions are addressed more fully in 
the second half of the third Critique, in which Kant shows how the 
concept of the purposiveness of nature (the sensible realm) must be 
grounded in that of freedom (something supersensible). This allows 
us to enrich our concept of nature beyond the limits of theoreti-
cal reason alone—even if only for the purposes of what Kant calls 
“practical cognition”. 
The goal of the Wissenschaftslehre is to show that this Kantian 
model is not merely a practical conjecture or postulate but is a re-
fl ection of the fundamental structure of I-hood as such, as demon-
strated in the Wissenschaftslehre, in which an unconditioned, spon-
taneously self-positing pure subject-object, can posit itself as such 
if and only if it also posits a realm of fi nitely free individuals and 
another of fi nite, causally interacting sensible things. Absolute free-
dom or self-suffi ciency, in the sense of the spontaneous self-positing 
of the pure I, is what Fichte calls “the ultimate point of origin of all 
reason,” and freedom is therefore, for him, not simply an article of 
practical faith but is at the same time “a theoretical principle for the de-
termination of our world.”48 Only in the Wissenschaftslehre does Kant’s 
characterization of freedom as the keystone of the entire system of 
pure reason fi nally receive an adequate explanation. But in order to 
provide such an explanation Fichte had to recast the results of the 
fi rst two Critiques in the light of the third in accordance with a new 
method of philosophical construction.
4. Nature’s purposiveness. Fichte’s concept of nature, as devel-
oped in the Foundations of Natural Right and System of Ethics is, like 
Kant’s, thoroughly teleological and incorporates Kant’s concept of 
natural organisms and of nature itself as an organism, the ultimate 
purpose of which is to be an appropriate instrument of the will and 
an effective means for advancing the ultimate end of the same (com-
plete self-suffi ciency).49 Fichte’s account of the fi nal, moral end of 
nature is deeply indebted to the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
and may well have been directly inspired by a footnote from § 83 
48. System of Ethics, GA, I/5: 77.
49. See GA, I/4: 377-79 and I/5: 139ff.
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of the third Critique, in which Kant remarks that the only criterion 
for determining the fi nal purpose of nature is “[the] value that we 
ourselves give to our lives through what we not only do, but do 
purposively and so independently of nature that even the existence 
of nature can be a purpose only under this condition.”50 “Therefore 
it is this [moral] legislation that enables man to be a fi nal purpose to 
which all of nature is teleologically subordinated.”51 Fichte expands 
this into the explicit doctrine that the external world as a whole and 
everything in it exists simply “in order to constitute a sphere for 
freedom” and can therefore be described as “the material of our 
duty made sensible.”52 But he rejects Kant’s insistence that such a 
teleological view of nature is merely “regulative,” inasmuch as he 
maintains that this is a theorem derived from the highest principles 
of his system. 
5. Heautonomy and autonomy of the I. Though Fichte does not 
adopt Kant’s term (from section V) of the Introduction to the third 
Critique,53 he nevertheless recognizes the difference between the 
“autonomy” of the I, understood as its capacity to act freely and to 
modify the sensible realm of the Not-I, and the “heautonomy” of 
the same, that is, its capacity to determine itself freely and in accord-
ance with its own, supersensible laws and norms. The self-referen-
tial character of this Kantian concept of heautonomy may therefore, 
as Henry Allison suggests, well have had a direct infl uence upon 
the development of Fichte’s conception of the self-referential, self-
reverting, and self-legislative character of the I.54
6. Abstraction in philosophy. Fichte appears to have been inspired 
by Kant’s account of how the general ideas of “common sense,” like 
the “normal ideas” produced by aesthetic genius, require abstraction 
from various particulars, and this process of abstraction is what un-
50. KU, V, 434n.
51. KU, V, 335-6.
52. “On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,” GA, I/5: 353.
53. See I. KANT, Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA, V, 185-86.
54. H. E. ALLISON, Refl ective Judgment and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kant’s 
Deduction of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume, in H. E. ALLISON, Essays on Kant 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 188.
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derlies the universality of such concepts. According to Kant, sensus 
communis is “the idea of a sense shared [by all human being], i.e., a 
power to judge, which, in refl ecting, takes account (a priori), in our 
thought, of everyone else’s way of representing [something], in order 
as it were to compare our own judgment with human reason in gen-
eral.” And we obtain to this standpoint by “comparing our judgment 
not so much with the actual as rather with the merely possible judg-
ments of others, and [thus] put ourselves in the position of everyone 
else, merely by abstracting from the limitation that happen to attach 
to our judging, and this in turn we accomplish by leaving out as much 
as possible whatever is matter, i.e., sensation, in the representational 
state.”55 It is diffi cult for a student of Fichte’s philosophy to read these 
lines without thinking at once of that act of global abstraction with 
which the Wissenschaftslehre begins, which is similarly intended to in-
sure the universality and objectivity of all the claims that follow. 
7. Refl ection in philosophy. A second source of inspiration for 
Fichte’s new philosophical method was Kant’s notion of “the power 
of refl ecting judgment,” the kind of thinking that proceeds from 
particulars to universals and does so by way of a combination of im-
aginatively inspired experiments and circumspect awareness of the 
results of the same, which Fiche calls “refl ection.” Just as the phi-
losopher must begin by abstracting from all that is “Not-I,” so must 
he constantly remain clearly aware of, that is “refl ect upon,” what 
he is doing in this act of abstraction and upon the product of the 
same. Indeed, Fichte often employs the same term Kant had used 
to describe the operation of the refl ecting power of judgment—
namely, aufsuchen or “seeking out”—to describe his own method of 
philosophizing. Thus he appears to have drawn from Kant’s remarks 
on refl ecting judgment new and original ideas concerning both the 
experimental strategy of philosophy and the distinctive method of 
the same. Fichte characterized his method of close self-observa-
tion following radical abstraction in various ways—as attentiveness 
(Aufmersamkeit), observation, and (most notoriously) “intellectual 
intuition”—but his usual name for his method of philosophizing 
55. AA, V, 291ff.
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is simply “refl ection.” Just as Kant thought that aesthetic ideas can 
only be “intuited,” so too, according to Fichte, can that process of a 
priori construction by means of which philosophy comes into being 
only be refl ected upon.56
8. The power of imagination in philosophy. Just as the artist is 
described by Kant as “seeking out” his higher concepts (so-called 
“aesthetic ideas”) by means of the power of imagination rather than 
by the application of any algorithm or set of rules, so Fichte thinks 
that the philosopher requires a similar creative use of the power of 
imagination in order to advance genetically or synthetically from one 
act of necessary positing to another. In this process he is directed by 
no rules, but is guided only by what Fichte calls “spirit in the nar-
rower sense” or the “sense of truth,” a matter of feeling rather than 
of thinking. My suggestion is that Fichte borrows Kant’s account of 
the function of the power of imagination in both artistic production 
and in judgments of taste and makes it central to his account of the 
synthetic method of philosophical construction.
9. “Genius” in philosophy. For this reason Fichte explicitly re-
jected Kant’s claim that the obscure imaginative capacity called “ge-
nius” has no place in philosophy. On the contrary, he insisted that 
that act of abstraction with which philosophy must begin must occur 
spontaneously in accordance with no rules. And the same applies to 
the philosopher’s “seeking out” of new constitutive acts of the mind, 
this too is a process guided only by creative imaginative and the 
philosopher’s inchoate “sense of truth.”57 On analogy with Kant’s 
56. It should also be noted that Fichte, in the System of Ethics, fully endorses Kant’s 
account of the role of refl ective judgment in identifying both natural organisms 
and nature as a whole as an organic unity. In addition, however, he also treats our 
ordinary reference of our representations to external objects as their cause as an 
application of “the refl ecting power of judgment.” See GA, I/5: 110.
57. “The human mind makes various experiments. By blind groping it succeeds in 
reaching the dawn, and only then does it emerge into the bright light. It is led 
at fi rst by obscure feelings [...] and if we had not begun with obscure feelings 
of things we did not clearly recognize until later, we should still have no clear 
concepts to this day.” The history of philosophy teaches us how, in this manner, 
philosophers have groped their way ever nearer to their goal: to separate 
the intellect’s necessary manner of acting from any accidental accompanying 
conditions (Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, GA, I/2: 144).
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notion of aesthetic genius, Fichte calls this “obscure feeling for what 
is right” philosophical genius and views it as indispensable.58 He elabo-
rates on this point in the Foundations of Natural Right, where he 
defi nes philosophical genius as:
[…] the talent, even while engaged in acting, to discover not 
only what arises as a result of this action but also acting itself, 
considered as such—the talent to unify these two completely 
opposed views within a single comprehension and thereby to 
apprehend one’s own mind ‘in the act,’ as it were, thereby ob-
taining an utterly new domain for consciousness.59
10. The “hovering” of the poser of imagination. “Schweben” is an ordi-
nary German word meaning “fl oat,” “hover,” or “oscillate,” often 
used to describe the way an idea one is considering may be said 
to “fl oat before” one’s mind. This is also, of course, the technical 
term employed in the Foundations of the entire Wissenschaftslehre to 
describe the way in which the synthetic power of imagination is 
able to reconcile and unite opposites by “hovering” above them or 
“oscillating” between them. It is not clear where Fichte obtained 
this usage, but I would suggest that a good candidate is § 17 of 
third Critique, where Kant describes the power of imagination as 
“hovering” or “oscillating” as it tries to hit upon a determinate 
concept for an aesthetic form that it has apprehended via sensible 
intuition, a concept Kant calls the standard idea [Normalidee] of 
the beautiful and describes as “an image for the entire kind, hov-
ering between the singular and multiply varied intuitions of the 
individuals”.60
11. Art and aesthetic ideas. Directly inspired by Kant, Fichte 
developed his own view of art as a propaedeutic, something that me-
diates between the sensible and supersensible.61 But whereas Kant 
58. GA, I/2: 142.
59. GA, I/3: 316.
60. I. KANT, AA, V, 234.
61. In the System of Ethics Fichte describes aesthetic feeling as occupying a middle 
position between the feeling of sensual pleasure and that of moral respect, and 
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suggests that aesthetic experience might be viewed as a propaedeutic 
to moral experience, Fichte treats it as a propaedeutic to philosophy 
and claims that the artist and philosopher both occupy the same 
transcendental standpoint, though the former does so only uncon-
sciously. One of the things that distinguishes Fichte’s treatement of 
art from Kant‘s is that, whereas the latter was primarily concerned 
with judgments of taste, Fichte is almost exclusive concerned with 
the production of aesthetic ideas and the role of the power of creative 
imagination therein. The real objects of what Fichte calls “the aes-
thetic drive” are always internal images or ideas and not the physical 
exhibition of the same in the sensible world.62
12. The categorical imperative as harmony with oneself. Readers 
of Fichte’s Lectures on the Scholar’s Vocation will be familiar what 
appears to be his radical revision of Kant’s categorical imperative, 
namely: “Act so that you could consider the maxims of your willing 
to be eternal laws for yourself,” or “the will ought always to be at one 
with itself.”63 As distant as this may seem from Kant’s well-known 
discussion of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, it is fact simply a restatement of a claim put 
forward in § 59 of the third Critique, namely: “In a moral judgment 
we think of the freedom of the will as the will’s harmony with itself 
according to universal laws of reason”.64
13. Duty as a feeling of harmony among the drives. One of Fichte’s 
more surprising appropriations of material from the third Critique 
is found in his account, in the System of Ethics, of moral deliberation 
as a process that ends only when one discovers some object of a 
“natural drive” to be in harmony with the pure drive’s demand for 
complete self-suffi ciency. This produces a distinctive feeling, not of 
aesthetic pleasure, but rather of moral obligation. Thus, what Kant 
thus as a feeling that can help the individual to overcome the tension between his 
experiences of the sensible and intelligible worlds. See GA, I/5: 137.
62. For discussion of Fichte’s theory of art, see D. BREAZEALE, Against Art? Fichte 
on Aesthetic Experience and Fine Art, “Journal of the Faculty of Letters, The 
University of Tokyo, Aesthetics” 38 (2013) 25-42.
63. GA, I/3: 30, emphasis added.
64. AA, V, 354, emphasis added.
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says about judgments of taste in the Introduction to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment also applies to Fichte’s account of moral judg-
ment, namely that in this case “judgment decides by feeling rather 
than by harmony of concepts.”65 Since the two drives in harmony 
with one another in Fichte’s account are the same in everyone, the 
ensuing feeling of duty can be described as universal and objective, 
just as Kant describes the feeling of pleasure produced by the har-
monies of the two cognitive faculties that are the same in everyone.66 
Indeed, Fichte himself explicitly compares the feeling of conscience 
to the aesthetic feeling of disinterested pleasure and the process of 
moral judgment to aesthetic judgment.67 
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